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Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and 
one reductive account 
 
 
 
Philosophers of science have often favoured reductive approaches to how-possibly 
explanation. This article identifies three alternative conceptions making how-possibly 
explanation an interesting phenomenon in its own right.  
 
The first variety approaches “how possibly X?” by showing that X is not epistemically 
impossible. This can sometimes be achieved by removing misunderstandings 
concerning the implications of one’s current belief system but involves 
characteristically a modification of this belief system so that acceptance of X does not 
result in contradiction.  
 
The second variety offers a potential how-explanation of X. It is usually followed by a 
range of further potential how-explanations of the same phenomenon. In recent 
literature the factual claims implied by the second variety have been downplayed 
whereas the heuristic role of mapping the space of conceptual possibilities has been 
emphasized. I will focus especially on this truth-bracketing sense of potentiality when 
looking closer at the second variety in the paper. 
 
The third variety has attracted less interest. It presents a partial how-explanation of X. 
Typically it aims to establish the existence of a mechanism by which X could be and 
was generated. The third conception stands out as the natural alternative for the 
advocate of ontic how-possibly explanations.  
 
This article transfers Salmon’s (1984) view that explanation-concepts can be broadly 
divided into epistemic, modal, and ontic to the context of how-possibly explanations. 
Moreover, it is argued that each of the three above-mentioned varieties of how-possibly 
explanation occurs in science. To recognize this may be especially relevant for 
philosophers. We are often misled by the promises of various why-explanation 
accounts, and seem to have forgotten nearly everything about the diversity of how-
possibly explanations. 
 
1. The Dray-Hempel variety: from epistemic conflict to 
consistency  
 
Hempel (1970) offers an account of how-possibly explanation in two steps. These can 
preferably be distinguished.1 The first step builds on Dray (1957) and his observation 
about in which contexts we require how-possibly explanations: 
                                                
1 Already the first step captures a distinct notion whereas the second step is reductive 
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[T]he demand for explanation is, in some contexts, satisfactorily met if what 
happened is merely shown to have been possible; there is no need to go on to 
show that it was necessary as well. To put the point another way, I shall argue that 
although, as Professor Toulmin puts it, to explain a thing is often to “show that it 
might have been expected”, the appropriate criterion for [how-possibly 
explanations] is broader than this; for to explain a thing is sometimes merely to 
show that it need not have caused surprise. (Dray 1957, 157) 
 
Dray emphasizes the element of surprise. He even claims that the essential feature of a 
how-possibly explanation is that it is given “in the face of a certain sort of puzzlement” 
(Dray 1957, 165).  
 
But this first variety can be characterised independently of its psychological features. 
The need for how-possibly explanations arises when the explanandum, X, is (or at least 
seems to be) ruled out by the corpus of theories and empirical assumptions relied on in 
the explanans context (or “the system” as I will occasionally refer to it from now on). 
Many explanations—even why-explanations—are prompted by the belief that X should 
not have happened, but in this case it is (or seems) impossible to add X to the system, 
and this is what is characteristic about how-possibly explanations: 
 
[…] some of the beliefs we hold concerning relevant matters of fact seem to us to 
make it impossible or at least highly improbable that X should have occurred 
(Hempel 1970, 428). 
 
As a consequence the process of finding explanans stops before it has started.  
 
With the exception of the belief in X itself, this variety of how-possibly explanation 
does not require evidence gathering in favour of any new explanatory pieces of belief 
about the world. What is needed is either a correction of one’s perceptions of what the 
system is in fact consistent with or, more characteristically, a withdrawal of those 
elements in the system that would make a contradiction appear were a belief in the 
explanandum phenomenon to be added. Note that it is the only of the varieties to be 
discussed here that is about the acceptability of the explanandum itself.  
 
As already advertised Hempel goes on to add a second step to his account of how-
possibly explanation. But what we have, already, is in line with Hempel’s idea that a 
successful explanation shows that the explanandum phenomenon was in fact to be 
expected. After removal of conflicting beliefs, the non-occurrence of X is no longer to 
be expected, at least not to the previous degree. 
 
1.1 Illustration: The paradox of the plankton 
 
The Dray-Hempel variety of how-possibly explanation seems to be operative in relevant 
scientific contexts. One case in point is what Hutchinson (1961) labelled the paradox of 
the plankton. Findings indicated that, particularly in summer times, natural waters 
present an environment with “striking” nutrient deficiency. According to the principle 
of competitive exclusion (Hardin 1960), we should expect that under such conditions 
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one species would outcompete the others “so that in a final equilibrium situation the 
assemblage would reduce to a population of a single species” (Hutchinson 1961, 137). 
However, in summer times a number of species of plankton are known to coexist.  
 
The paradoxical character of this situation is evident. On the one hand the principle of 
competitive exclusion was supposed not only to be strongly corroborated but even 
analytically true; on the other hand it seemed to be an empirical fact that the principle 
came to the wrong prediction in this case:  
 
The problem that is presented by the phytoplankton is essentially how it is 
possible for a number of species to coexist in relatively isotropic or unstructured 
environment all competing for the same sorts of materials. (Hutchinson 1961, 
137) 
 
The primary explanatory ambition in such a case is to make the picture consistent—to 
decide on what in our explanatory belief system has to go when the explanandum is 
added (or, in simpler cases, to remove certain misconceptions we have about what this 
system implies).  This is exactly the kind of situation Hempel centres on in the first step 
of his account of how-possibly explanation. By implication any attempt to adjust an 
explanatory theory so that it avoids falsification in light of new evidence is a possible 
instance in case. At least sometimes the scientist thinks of such an enterprise in terms of 
explaining how-possibly. Hutchinson apparently did. 
 
2. The reductive response: From how-possibly questions to 
why-answers 
 
What happens in step one above is normally not the end of the explanatory process 
triggered by a how-possibly question of Hempel’s variety. The explanatory-seeking 
agent usually moves on beyond the first stage of restored consistency. Hempel (1970, 
429) claims that a why-explanation attempt naturally follows. The guiding idea seems to 
be that the explanatory features of how-possibly explanations reduce to this second step 
involving why-explanation: 
 
Someone who asks how X could possibly have happened will not, as a rule, be 
satisfied to be told simply that he was mistaken in some of his empirical 
assumptions, which he thought precluded the occurrence of X; he will also want 
to be given a set of alternative, and presumably true, assumptions which, in 
conjunction with the rest of his background beliefs explain to him why X 
occurred. (Hempel 1970, 429)  
 
There is an obvious problem with reductive attempts along Hempel’s lines. It cannot be 
ruled out that enquiry starts with one type of explanatory-seeking question but continues 
with another. It does not take more than that there is an intermediary explanatory step of 
the kind described in the Dray-Hempel variety for us to have every reason to be 
sceptical about the reductive approach. A developmental account, where both of the two 
stages may be recognized as explanatory, would be a more modest position. Hempel 
clearly offers an interesting sketch of a developmental account of how-possibly 
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explanation; whether it is, also, intended to be reductive we leave as an open question. It 
cannot be motivated from the context of the Dray-Hempel variety unless the agent 
always moves directly from conflict and inconsistency to a new potential why-
explanation.2  
 
Going back somewhat in philosophical history, however, a frequent claim is precisely 
that every satisfactory explanation has to be an answer to a why-question. On this view, 
how-possibly explanation can—to the extent that it is an explanation—be nothing but 
why-explanation (see Salmon 1989, 136-137).3 This view more clearly exemplifies the 
reductive position.  
 
However, the above prima facie objection still stands. In order to merit attention the 
reductive account has to be promising as a descriptive account. Therefore, it is of 
interest whether there is an intermediary and explanatory first step in Dray-Hempel 
cases. In order to evaluate the position it is useful to know whether yet other varieties of 
how-possibly explanation exist. If so that would further complicate the relations 
between how-possibly explanation and why-explanation. The reductive account 
presupposed by some why-explanationists would be rather unattractive if, as I shall now 
argue, there are several distinct varieties of how-possibly explanation. 
 
3. Potential how-explanation: bracketing truth-claims and 
mapping the space of possibilities 
 
An alternative view of how-possibly explanation can be generated rather swiftly. The 
“possibly” in “how possibly” may qualify a how-explanation in a similar way that 
Hempel’s term “potential” in “potential explanation” qualifies a why-explanation. On 
                                                
2 It may well be that Hempel thinks that this is the case, and that we can simply rephrase a how-possibly 
question as “Why did this event (which I initially regarded as impossible or highly improbable) occur?” 
(Salmon 1989, 137), but his following observation that many why-question can be rephrased as how-
possibly questions clearly does not prove as much: 
 
”[…] questions of the form ‘why is not the case that p?’ […] might well be rephrased as ‘how-possibly’ 
questions: ‘How could it possibly be the case that not-p?’. Questions such as ‘Why doesn’t the Leaning 
Tower of Pisa topple over?’ or ‘Why don’t the antipodes fall off the earth?’, ‘If reflection in a plane 
mirror interchanges right and left, why not also top and bottom?’ will normally be raised only if the 
questioner entertains certain assumptions concerning relevant empirical matters which seem to him to 
make it certain or, at any rate, highly probable that the specified phenomenon should occur. A 
pragmatically adequate answer again will have to clear up the empirical or logical misapprehensions 
underlying this belief.” (Hempel 1970, 429) 
 
What such examples can show, I think, is that some why-questions are complex and that some how-
possibly expressions are why-questions in disguise. If the observations in this talk are correct, both are 
very different from showing that every how-possibly explanation without residue can be rephrased as a 
why-explanation. 
3 However, the reductive perspective is often formulated and motivated rather casually: Cohen (1950, 
259) requires of any explanation that it be an “appropriate answer to the question ‘why’ the explicandum 
is the case”; Braithwaite (1947, ii) states that an explanation is simply “any answer to a ‘why’ question 
which in any way answers the question, and thereby gives some degree of intellectual satisfaction to the 
questioner” (see Dray 1957, 156); van Fraassen (1980) echoes his forerunners. Given the sweeping 
formulations of Cohen and his contemporaries, it is perhaps misleading to understand these positions as 
serious reductive attempts at all. 
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this understanding a particular how-possibly explanation is almost like a how-
explanation. The difference is that claims about how the world is, that the explanans of 
the how-explanation involves, are bracketed in the how-possibly explanation.  
 
I want to separate two possible ways of interpreting bracketing. The reason is that we 
seem to have accounts of how-possibly explanation along both lines. I want to talk of a 
literal, metaphysical sense of bracketing. But I also want to acknowledge its epistemic 
counterpart. In the metaphysical sense bracketing stands for an intervention where a 
how-explanation is robbed of its implications about how the world is. On this reading, a 
how-possibly explanation does not make the kind of claim about the world that the how-
explanation does. In the epistemic sense (to turn to its counterpart), bracketing reflects 
the fact that when we are dealing with how-possibly explanations we do not know 
whether the explanation is true. (This may be expressed in terms of the lack of adequate 
justification for how-possibly explanations.) On this reading, how-explanations are 
known to be true (or are adequately justified) whereas how-possibly explanations are 
not. 
 
There are many possibly reasons why one might be interested in potential how-
explanations – whether conceived of as making no claims about how the world is or not 
being known to be true (or adequately justified). There is a spill over effect from 
differences in explanatory interest to how, more precisely, one’s conception of how-
possibly explanation of this variety is crafted. Before restricting the discussion to 
potential how-possibly explanations in the metaphysical sense4 I want briefly to 
introduce two explanatory interests that may result in potential how-possibly 
explanations. 
 
The first example I select is discussed by Resnik (1991). In biology, he claims, certain 
explanations make scientific service despite their lack of adequate justification. Resnik 
(1991, 144) cites Darwin’s explanations of the origin of biological adaptations as an 
influential instance in case. When discussing the evolution of bird wings, Darwin 
suggests that these could have developed in a series of evolutionary steps from 
appendages that were not capable of flight. This how-possibly explanation had many 
explanatory virtues. But the empirical evidence at the time was fragmentary, at best. 
And the same goes for many of today’s evolutionary explanations in biology as well as 
in other disciplines.  
 
Now, the concept Resnik develops clearly concerns epistemic bracketing, and will not 
be discussed further at this point.5 In contrast, the conception I am concerned with here 
is the related phenomenon of bracketing of truth-claims concerning any particular how-
possibly explanation. However, the motivation behind Resnik’s conception – it seems to 
me – fits nicely with the understanding of how-possibly explanations as potential how-
explanations of this variety. 
 
                                                
4 Its epistemic counterpart will be dealt with, briefly, in the end of the paper. 
5 According to him, the lack of adequate empirical support is definitive of how-possibly explanation. 
How-possibly explanations may become how-actually explanations as science progresses. It is a position 
reminiscent of Levi’s (2003) understanding of dispositions. His dispsitions can become real as science 
progresses. See also Persson (2006). Machamer et al. (2000) seems attracted to a similar idea. 
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Maybe the second example is even more to the point. Neurath (1916) suggests that in 
order not to have to rely on ‘insight’ historiography should proceed in two steps. First, 
in a particular field, the elements out of which any particular theory could be 
reconstructed are to be identified. For instance, the optical theories of Huygens, 
Newton, Malebranche and others can be identified with the field of possible optical 
theories at a certain time. This first stage relies exclusively on ‘a purely logical point of 
view.’ It sees every possible theory as having equal value. “A special pleading is needed 
if one of them is preferred (Neurath 1916, 16; see also Reisch 1994, 168). 
Differentiating values are not introduced until the second stage. How-possibly 
explanations, on this understanding, span the space of possible options at a certain time: 
 
For a best possible mastery of historical development it is desirable to make a 
preparatory survey of all groupings of individual views that are possible in 
principle. Maybe the start can be made from the theory of greatest power, if there 
is one of this character. (Neurath 1916, 30) 
 
Several philosophers have advocated views such as Neurath’s. I will soon return to the 
role of how-possibly explanations in spanning the space of possibilities. But first two 
exemplifications of the basic conception of how-possibly explanation I am identifying. 
 
Salmon (1989, 137) is one example of an advocate of how-possibly explanations of the 
second variety. He holds the view that: “a how-possibly question does not require an 
actual explanation; any potential explanation not ruled out by known facts is a suitable 
answer.” There is an epistemic residue in this characterization but it is not farfetched to 
suggest that for Salmon we are not only warranted in claiming that a how-possibly 
explanation without adequate justification may be acceptable. A stronger claim is 
motivated. It is of no relevance per se whether the how-possibly explanation is (or 
parallels) an ontic explanation. In other words, the explanation qua how-possibly 
explanation does not involve any truth-claims concerning the explanans. These are 
bracketed in the metaphysical sense introduced earlier. The following, somewhat 
lengthy, quotation should make this clear: 
 
[…] a DC-9 jet airplane recently crashed upon takeoff at Denver’s Stapleton 
Airport during a snowstorm. One peculiar feature of this accident is that the plane 
flipped over onto its back. There are many explanations of a crash under the 
circumstances, but I wondered how it could have flipped over. Two how-possibly 
explanations were mentioned in the news reports. One is that it encountered wing-
tip turbulence from another airplane just after it became airborne. Another was 
suggested by the report of a survivor, who claimed that the plane was de-iced 
three times during its wait for departure, but that on the latter two of these 
occasions one wing, but not the other was treated. If one wing had an 
accumulation of ice on its leading edge while the other did not, the difference in 
lift provided by the two wings might have been sufficient cause for the plane to 
flip over. As I write this paragraph I have not yet heard the final determination 
regarding the cause of this crash. Both potential explanations I have mentioned 
are satisfactory answers to the how-possibly question, but we do not know the 
correct answer to the why-question. (Salmon 1989, 137, my emphasis) 
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Other recent examples of the second variety are the views of Machamer et al. (2000), 
Craver and Darden (2005), and Craver (2007). However, looking at their suggestions 
through the lenses I have suggested above reveals some differences that may lead to 
uncertainty about their position within the two dimensions I examine. First, Machamer 
et al. (2000) invites us to think about “how-possibly, how-plausibly, and how-actually.” 
This contextualization of how-possibly inspires the epistemic interpretation. Second, 
Craver and Darden (2005, 236) seems to suggest a metaphysical “error theory” 
interpretation of how-possibly explanations. Or at least that is one way of reading the 
following passage:  
 
The observable phenomena of the natural world are to be explained in terms of 
hidden mechanisms, and these mechanisms are to be inferred using well 
controlled experiments to sort how-actually from how-possibly descriptions of 
mechanisms. 
 
The need for, as well as the nature of, the business of sorting out implies that how-
possibly explanations make claims about the world – claims which are in fact false (!). 
The following quote from Craver (2007, 112) can be interpreted in both ways:  
 
How-possibly models are often heuristically useful in constructing and exploring 
the space of possible mechanisms, but they are not adequate explanations. 
 
In agreement with Neurath and Salmon, Craver claims that when explaining how-
possibly one does not need to presuppose that the explanans elements exist and – if so – 
whether they are organized in reality the way they are in the model. Prima facie no 
truth-claim concerning the particular how-possibly explanans needs to be involved in 
this characterisation. But the final verdict depends on what it is that makes how-
possibly explanations inadequate. Is it – pace Craver and Darden (2005) – that they 
bracket claims about truth (metaphysical interpretation)? Is it that they are false? 
(metaphysical error theory)? Is it that they lack justification (epistemic interpretation)? 
Well, it is safe to conclude that it is one of these three. How-actually models, by 
contrast, (claim to) describe real features of the mechanism that in fact produces the 
explanandum phenomenon. 
 
One of the examples Craver (2007) deploys is from neuroscience. It concerns the 
history of the discovery of the action potential. More specifically it concerns the 
possibility that ions are conveyed across the membrane by active transport. Bertil Hille 
developed a model, which is now textbook material. According to it, changes in action 
potentials are explained by opening and closing of transmembrane channels. To begin 
with, Hille (1992) presented a range of different how-possibly models. The models 
differed in their parts, in the activities the parts took part, as well as in how the 
mechanisms were organized: 
 
There are swinging gates, sliding gates, free-floating blockers, tethered balls and 
chains, rotating cylinders, and assembling components. Hille intended these as 
merely how-possibly models because he had no idea whether the channels would 
turn out to have parts of the requisite sort, or whether the parts could act as the 
model requires, or whether their activities were organized in the way that the 
model suggests. (Craver 2007, 117-118) 
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This final illustration combines the two features we have been concerned with in this 
section on how-possibly explanation as potential how-explanation. First, according to 
Craver’s description Hille’s model is a how-possibly explanation since it brackets 
claims about how the world is (metaphysical interpretation). This decision is grounded 
in lack of knowledge. Second, it utilizes these how-possibly explanations to map the 
space of possible explanations. Most of these possible explanations, it later turned out, 
could be ruled out in the face of known constraints and plausibility arguments (see 
Craver 2007, 118). 
 
More could be said about this family of relatively common interpretations of how-
possibly explanations. However, the cluster of conceptions offered so far make the need 
for yet another complementary understanding of how-possibly explanation obvious. 
This complementary conception constitutes this article’s primary addition to our 
knowledge of how-possibly explanations.  
 
Before we move on, however, it should be noted that the second variety (potential how-
explanations) and the first variety (the Dray-Hempel variety) differ in several ways. The 
Dray-Hempel variety need not constitute substantial explanations, let alone substantial 
how-explanations. It is not really concerned with the explanans side of the explanation. 
In contrast, the second variety (potential how-explanation) requires many of the 
explanatory virtues of actual how-explanations. Exactly what virtue, if any, they cannot 
have may differ. According to Resnik (1990) and Craver (2007) they should not be 
backed up by adequate empirical evidence.6 Neurath (1916) and Salmon (1989), as I 
read them, suggest instead that in how-possibly explanations truth-claims regarding the 
explanans are bracketed. That is, the potential explanation may be an actual – i.e. ontic 
or true – or adequately backed up explanation but whether or not it is is of no relevance 
in the context of how-possibly explanation.  
 
Let us now ponder in which scientific contexts the two varieties appear. The Dray-
Hempel variety occurs in an environment of conflicting beliefs and a certain sort of 
puzzlement. The context of the present variety, by contrast, is typically one of 
discovery, hypothesis generation, or exploration of a range of possible explanations in a 
research environment where the explanandum phenomenon is accepted as a fact and 
now needs to be integrated with the system. 
 
4. Partial how-explanation: claiming the existence of an 
ontically explanatory mechanism 
 
It is time to introduce yet another conception of how-possibly explanation. Inevitably, 
that the first and second conceptions of how-possibly explanation make no claims 
concerning the truth of the explanans in the actual world—or lacks adequate empirical 
support in favour of the explanans—provides room for independent conceptions. The 
absence of these features implies that the previous conceptions will not generalize to 
certain, apparently important, cases. Some how-possibly explanations entail more 
                                                
6 And, as already noted, in some places Craver and Darden might add the further restriction that the how-
possibly explanation is actually false. 
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factual and/or empirically justified claims than the how-explanation conceptions of the 
previous sections can harbour. Below follows just a few examples that testify to this 
fact: 
 
A fundamental question is how it is possible for the shuttling transport receptors 
to carry their cargo in only one direction. (Kutay et al. 2007) 
 
By studying the biology of coral reproduction and recruitment, we gain an 
understanding of how it is possible to slowly degrade a reef. (Richmond 1997, 
175) 
 
By starvation and by oxygenation and by a combination of starvation and 
oxygenation we have seen how it is possible to shift the protozoa about almost 
any way we wish. (Cleveland 1925, 317) 
 
Apparently, in these cases the desired answers are not merely possible ways the world 
could be in order to produce the explanandum phenomena. Pace Salmon (1989, 138), 
far from “any potential explanation not ruled out by known facts is a suitable answer” to 
these three problems. The reason is that it matters a lot to the explanations on offer if 
they depict facts or not. For instance, the passage in Richmond (1997) continues: “This 
understanding is of central importance to coral-reef management and preservation”. It 
matters even more – to the researchers themselves, that is – whether the how-possibly 
explanations on offer are empirically justified. This group of how-possibly explanations 
clearly makes claims about the world. It is usually mandatory that they are supported by 
adequate evidence. Hence there is disagreement between the third variety and the 
second variety regardless of our interpretation of potential explanations. Conflict 
appears whether potential how-explanations are interpreted metaphysically or 
epistemically.  
 
However, the primary interpretation of the group of how-possibly explanations we are 
concerned with now is metaphysical or – as I shall prefer – ontic. What is needed as 
explanans are facts that make the explanandum phenomenon physically (or, in these 
cases, biologically) possible by providing a partial mechanism that in fact had the 
explanandum as outcome.  
 
Let us expand briefly on the latest example. L. R. Cleveland is interested in the 
symbiosis between termites and their intestinal protozoa. With protozoa the termites 
seem to be able to feed only on wood, but without protozoa such a diet kills them within 
a few weeks. In this particular study, Cleveland wanted to find out how (i.e. in what 
ways) it is possible that the presence of protozoa in termites varies. He conjectured that 
oxygen could be one key. High levels of oxygen are toxic to many species. In his 
experiments, whereas protozoa quickly died from oxygen exposure, termites proved to 
be unaffected by even high levels of oxygen. “They easily live eight to ten days in an 
oxygen atmosphere which kills their intestinal protozoa in three days” (Cleveland 1925, 
316). Similarly, starvation proved effective. Protozoa died well before their hosts did in 
circumstances of starvation.  
 
These experimental results help Cleveland to the claim that he has found the answer to 
his how-possibly question. This immediately proves that the how-possibly question 
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posed in this context is neither one of epistemic inconsistency nor of mere potentiality 
in Neurath’s or Salmon’s sense. Indirectly, it also implies that Resnik’s (1991) analysis 
of how-possibly explanations in biology does not cover this case.7 As we remember, 
Resnik explicitly attempted to characterize how-possibly explanations in biology 
exactly by their lack of adequate empirical evidence: 
 
An explanation is a how-possibly explanation if and only if it 1) lacks adequate 
empirical support, but 2) still satisfies other explanatory virtues. (Resnik 1991, 
143) 
 
The kind of support Cleveland and others provide in favour of their conclusions that 
they have found part of the ontic explanation is normally rather impressive experimental 
data.  
 
One conceptual question remains. Why then are these “possibly”-explanations? It may 
seem that they are too “actual” for that. My basic claim is that they deserve the epithet 
“possible” by claiming the existence of a mechanism without which the explanandum 
phenomenon would not have been produced (in the actual way this happened), but this 
part of the story is not sufficient to account for the truth of the explanandum.8 These 
explanations are about a mechanistic or – broadly speaking – ontic sense of this-worldly 
possibility. This possibility is established by providing the mechanistic truth-maker 
needed for claims about how the phenomenon could – and in fact did – come about. 
However, such explanations amount to less than a complete how-explanation in that 
they may not include all the mechanistic facts we may need in order to see more 
precisely how the explanandum phenomenon was produced.  
 
In this sense the third variety of how-possibly explanation identified here is doubly 
interesting to compare with potential how-explanations. It seems that the present variety 
can be formulated like this: 
 
An explanation is a how-possibly explanation if and only if it 1) is an ontic 
explanation, but 2) lacks certain other explanatory features of how-explanations. 
 
5. How and how possibly 
 
According to several conceptions of how-explanations causal or mechanistic detail is 
crucial for how-explanations. Dray, for instance, acknowledges this feature in historical 
how-explanations: 
 
‘Explaining how’ may also mean making clear the detailed steps by which 
something came about. Thus Chester Wilmot states the theme of his recent book, 
The Struggle for Europe, as: “Not only how Hitler was overthrown but how Stalin 
                                                
7 It is trivial that this how-possibly explanation does not imply that the explanans are not adequate or – 
worse still – false. 
8 There are of course a number of complications that should be contemplated at this point and which have 
to do with the possibility of the existence of several mechanisms that might yield the same outcome. But 
they do not matter in this context, where the only thing I want to point out is the distinctness of this 
variety in comparison with the other varieties I have identified. 
For EPSA 2009, Amsterdam 
© Johannes Persson, Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Lund 
 
 
 11 
emerged victorious, how Russia came to replace Germany as the dominant power 
in Europe, and how Stalin succeeded in obtaining from Roosevelt and Churchill 
what he failed to obtain from Hitler.” This sense of ‘explaining how’ is a very 
common one in history, but it is quite different from explaining how something 
could be so. (Dray 1957, 166-167) 
 
As this paper shows, I do not necessarily agree with Dray on what it is to explain how 
something could be so. What I do agree with Dray in is that it is rather easy to maintain 
a difference between typical how-possibly explanations and how-explanations by the 
amount of causal detail. How-possibly explanations diverge from and overlap with 
how-explanations by being partial how-explanations. This possibility, however, is 
absent in the second variety. Potential how-explanations are just like complete how-
explanations in this respect.  
 
6. In favour of how-possibly explanations of the third variety 
 
Mechanisms are seldom causally isolated. There is causal interaction beyond the 
boundaries of mechanisms and between mechanisms. In order to be able to fill in the 
causal details of one how-explanation one sometimes needs to establish the existence of 
the surrounding mechanisms. And often, in biology at least, one is expected to back up 
a how-explanation by something more than an evolutionary just so story. How-possibly 
explanations of the third variety are just what we need. 
 
I feel less convinced that Resnik’s variety, let alone Salmon and Craver’s, stands the 
test. Even when viewed as a heuristic it is probably generally to ask for too much and 
too little to present potential how-explanations without adequate empirical support. And 
it is normally never satisfactory to present a potential how-explanation that involves no 
existence claims concerning the explanans (not to mention the one which implicitly 
denies that the explanans does not exist).  
 
It is often to ask for too much since one partial mechanistic framework would be 
enough. We seldom move forward by first conjecturing about all details of all potential 
how-explanations. Moreover, if we are partially ignorant about how the world really is 
it is painful—and useless—to engage in such an activity.  
 
It is often to ask for too little since at least parts of the proposed potential how-
explanations should enjoy empirical support. It is more in accordance with “good” 
biological science to secure support in favour of the crucial elements of the how-
possibly explanation and leave the rest of the potential how-explanation sketchy or 
blank for the purpose of other studies. But the varieties of potential how-explanation we 
have pondered seem to require lack of support or even lack of existential claims, both of 
which make them unsuitable for the job.  
 
I am speculating somewhat here in the very end. But an odd thing this exercise uncovers 
is that had it been performed on why-explanations little time would probably have been 
spent on the issue of potential why-explanation. Lipton (2004) acknowledges that 
inference to the best explanation should be interpreted as inference to the best potential 
explanation for the obvious reason that our “inductive” scientific inferences are fallible. 
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The implication is that the divide between actual and potential is not terribly interesting 
for sorting explanations in actual science.  
 
This seems to lead to a dilemma for advocates of the second variety. First, unless the 
requirement on the second variety is that the empirical support should be next to nil or 
that no existential claims are involved it is difficult to uphold the difference between 
how-possibly explanations and ordinary how-explanations we meet with in scientific 
practice. Second, if this requirement is met how-possibly explanations are rather 
uncommon whereas so the potential how-explanations that frequently occur in science 
must be of another variety. For instance, the category of potential partial how-
explanation, i.e., potential how-possibly explanations of the third variety should be 
more common if the observations in this section are right. This, too, seems to make 
how-possibly explanations of the third variety more practically important than other 
varieties that we sometimes also report by expressions such as “How possibly X.” 
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